A Spy Too Far: Anthony Blunt, the Cambridge Five and Operation Market Garden
The Sunday Times is currently plugging a new book, by the Mail on Sunday Security Editor, Robert Verkaik. Verkaik claims in this exclusive splash to have made a profound discovery. A ‘double agent had betrayed Operation Market Garden [the September 1944 Allied attempt to capture bridges along the Eindhoven‑Nijmegen‑Arnhem corridor] to the Germans.’ That spy was the notorious member of the Cambridge Ring of Five, Anthony Blunt. Through this betrayal of Market Garden, Blunt’s ‘actions contributed to the deaths of tens of thousands of Allied servicemen and women and countless civilians who perished as a result of a prolonged war.’ Making him ‘arguably the most influential spy in history.’ If Verkaik is right, this really is a profound discovery. But he probably isn’t. Market Garden failed on its own terms, it did not require Blunt’s (in my view) unlikely intervention.
To begin, the article is littered with errors. Blunt is described as the ‘most elusive’ of the Cambridge Ring of Five (Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, John Cairncross and Anthony Blunt). He is not. He has been the subject of multiple biographies and described as ‘the most dangerous spy in history’. That latter assessment casts doubt on Verkaik next claim, ‘Blunt has been regarded as one of the more harmless of that group’. By whom? Verkaik doesn’t say. Regardless, none of the Cambridge Ring were remotely “harmless”. Yuri Modin, one of Blunt’s later handlers revealed that it was Blunt’s efforts leaking British counter-espionage operations to the rezidentura which ‘ensured that our position in London was rock solid’ and he was ‘an asset of great value’. (p. 90) But no matter, such errors are commonplace in espionage histories.
The central argument of the article, and presumably book, is that a German source codenamed “Josephine”, an asset of Karl Heinz Kraemer — but actually Blunt — had tipped off Berlin [presumably via Moscow] that the Market Garden operation was coming the day before it was launched. Though the information only arrived once the aircraft were in the air, this gave the Germans opportunity to rally and direct their forces, thus significant damage was inflicted on Market Garden which led to its ultimate failure.
To elaborate on the spy connection, in 1943: Anthony Blunt had been tasked with discovering the identity of “Josephine” (assuming “Josephine” ever even existed. MI5 was less than sure on this point). According to Verkaik, Blunt misidentified the source as ‘a loose-lipped Swedish diplomat called Frank Cervell’. He also angrily dismissed a hypothesis from Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) officer, Peter Falk, that “Josephine” was a Soviet asset. Blunt concluded that “Josephine” was a worthless source who produced a mixture of inaccurate rubbish and chicken-feed. This proved largely accurate until Josephine re-emerged during the D-Day preparations and then Market Garden, suddenly providing good intel.
This, apparently, was something of a lightbulb moment for Verkaik — what if Blunt was “Josephine” all along and was muddying the waters for his own purposes? Blunt’s earlier anger was, according to this reading, just a clever smoke screen.
And it was at this point that I began to seriously wonder what he had been up to. It was as if he was deliberately looking the wrong way. Could it be that Blunt was Josephine and had been tasked with investigating himself? How could that make any sense? After all, Blunt was a Russian spy not a German one.
It can’t make any sense because it doesn’t, Blunt was a convinced anti-Fascist and it was that, more than ideological communism, which motivated his betrayal. Indeed, as a student, Blunt had visited the Soviet Union and rapidly reached the conclusion that the Soviet paradise was not for him. Aside from what looks like a few fishy coincidences at first glance (but are better explained by Blunt and MI5's errors) regarding the misidentifying of “Josephine”, and Blunt’s subsequent role in MI5 investigations and reports, Verkaik presents no evidence that Blunt was “Josephine” at all. It is all supposition. In fact, a report into the episode concluded that “Josephine”, and another source dubbed Hector, were ‘types of information and not agents. He [Kraemer] had no agents in the UK.’ (part 4, p. 28).
Why would Moscow want Market Garden to fail in the first place, thus giving motive to this otherwise inexplicable spy-strategy? According to Verkaik, because the Western Allies were in a race to Berlin, it was in Stalin’s strategic interest to see the Allies in Western Europe trip on a few hurdles. This is all very well, but it is only speculation. Where are the documents which show that Stalin sought to scupper Market Garden? Certainly, Modin, who was given to bragging about his assets’ accomplishments, made no mention of this vast coup. Nor does this episode appear in the rare archive-based histories of Soviet intelligence activities in Britain.
But let’s pretend, for a moment, that Blunt was indeed “Josephine”, what impact could s/he had have? Verkaik writes,
At Arnhem the Allies had expected little resistance, but were met by a German force that was resilient and prepared. Was that just because they were battle-hardened veterans or had Market Garden been betrayed?
That sounds compelling, at least until we recall that the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) were not remotely prepared for Market Garden at all. Not in the days before the operation, not hours before it, and not even in the hours after it. In fact, the Allies achieved a degree of strategic surprise and the OKW had little idea what was happening at Nijmegen for the first 36 hours of the operation. It is quite clear that the Allies met stiff resistance, not because the German forces were prepared at any point, but because significant German forces were in the area, many in place before the operation was even conceived.
So what was the German strength in the weeks of September 1944 prior to the operation? The 40,000 troops of the First Parachute Army, led by General Kurt Student, had been posted along to the Dutch-Belgian border, between Antwerp (45 miles from Eindhoven) and Maastricht (42 miles from Eindhoven) to stem the flow of German troops withdrawing into the Dutch interior. Student’s HQ was a mere 15 miles from Eindhoven at Vught. The 107th Division was moving into Holland from Germany, they would cause the Allies problems around Son during the operation. Importantly, the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions had arrived near Arnhem on the 7th, again a part of the efforts by the OKW to regroup and plug the gaps in its lines. The Allies knew full well the German strength in the region, but, confident they could handle it, pressed ahead regardless. As Lieutenant-General Frederick Browning, a key figure in planning of the operation, briefed the 1st Airborne Division on 13 September:
The enemy is fighting determinedly along the line ALBERT and ESCAULT canals from ANTWERP to inclusive MAASTRICHT. His line is held by remnants of some good divisions, including Parachute Divisions, and by some new arrivals from HOLLAND. They are fighting well but have few reserves. The total armoured strength is probably not more than 50–100 tanks, mostly Mark IV. (p. 34)
In short, the Allied leadership knew in broad terms at least the German strength, numbers and disposition. Note that the two SS Panzer Divisions were already in place at Arnhem on the 7 September, before Field Marshal Montgomery even pitched the Market Garden plan to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, Dwight Eisenhower on 10 September. The Allies simply discounted the possibility that these forces would pose a major threat. They were wrong.
That leads to Verkaik’s central case as regards Market Garden:
At 3pm on September 17, just two hours after Allied paratrooper and glider landings had begun, two SS Panzer Divisions, the 9th and 10th, were sent immediately to engage the enemy at Arnhem and nearby Nijmegen, an order that is credited with playing a decisive role in securing the German victory. There is a strong case to be made that the speed of their deployment was as a result of the intelligence the Germans had received.
In fact, there is no need whatsoever to make any such argument. The parachute drops took place during the daytime. Though the attack came as a surprise to the German commanders, they could still see the vast carpet of parachutes and they could hear the thunderous roar of the aircraft. This was, after all, the largest airborne assault in history.
They knew where the men were were dropping, it did not require strategic genius to work out that Arnhem was the likely target. They responded accordingly. Generalfeldmarschall Model, as depicted in the classic 1977 war film of the operation, A Bridge Too Far, initially believed he was the target and beat a hasty retreat. But he left orders to defend key positions. As such, the commander at Arnhem, General Kussin, and the Germans were able to respond swiftly and deploy their forces to do precisely that.
In short, there is no concrete evidence presented in the article that Blunt was “Josephine”. There is no evidence that “Josephine’s” intelligence, assuming it amounted to anything, made any difference to Market Garden. Indeed, the suggestion that it did betrays both a misunderstanding of intelligence, its impact and its use. As the authorised historian of GCHQ, Professor John Ferris, notes of Signals Intelligence in the Second World War, such foresight is a force multiplier. It does not win battles or wars. What it does is to allow forces to increase their effectiveness and to undermine that of their enemies. Of course, I am criticising an article in a newspaper — who knows what evidence was trimmed? The book may provide the crucial evidence missing here. We will have to wait and see.
PS: I have now spoken on ‘X’ to the literary agent (I think) of the book. He suggested I take a look at KV 2/157 (parts 3 & 4 of the download). It is unclear to me how this material makes the case. Ultimately, as the literary agent suggests, we will have to wait for the book.
PPS. The historian Miranda Carter, author of the standard and excellent biography of Blunt, has shared her thoughts on ‘X’. It is a thread worth reading in full.
